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The Global Shift to 5G: How to Leverage
Bilateral Access Reciprocity Agreements to
Protect Telecommunications Infrastructure and
Achieve Growth
BRITTANY WIGHTMAN*
Abstract
As the five times faster, twenty-five times more robust, 5G network
becomes the global standard, behind China’s technological leadership in the
space, telecommunications network security is of ever-increasing
importance. Since 2016, researchers have observed as China Telecom, a
government-controlled telecommunications company with a large global
presence, hijacked Internet traffic directed towards financial institutions,
government sites, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and news organizations.
The hijacks, which go largely undetected by victims, are possible anywhere
a malicious actor has access to the technology that directs information from
one location to another across the Internet. As the United States and its allies
evaluate options for sourcing 5G components and developing 5G
infrastructure, domestic and international regulatory regimes must be
adjusted to meet the risk. Access Reciprocity agreements, which could be
adopted in parallel or as an addendum to existing regional trade agreements
(RTAs), would be likely to offset the threat of government sponsored cyberattacks. That said, unless the U.S. and our allies put the same resources
behind telecommunication innovation that our adversaries have, this
approach could stunt the U.S.’s competitive edge in other sectors.
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I. Introduction
As the five times faster, twenty-five times more robust, 5G network
becomes the global standard, behind China’s leadership in the space,
telecommunications network security is of ever-increasing importance.
Telecommunications network hijacking is already commonplace. With
pressure to deploy 5G networks rapidly, risks to privacy and national security
are becoming more pronounced. As the new network is rolled out around
the globe, demand for 5G access is leading to reliance on technically insecure
components. On top of an already insecure global telecommunications
network, implementation of compromised 5G technology will present an
unacceptable risk to domestic national security.
Since 2016, researchers have observed as China Telecom, a government
controlled telecommunications company with a large global presence,
hijacked Internet traffic directed towards financial institutions, government
sites, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and news organizations.1 The
hijacks, which go largely undetected by victims, are possible anywhere a
malicious actor has access to the technology that directs information from
one location to another across the Internet.2 As the United States and its
allies evaluate options for sourcing 5G components and developing 5G
infrastructure, domestic and international regulatory regimes must be
adjusted to meet the risk.
Until the U.S. and its allies are able to produce the technology required
of 5G networks at a competitive rate, the market will continue to push for
access to the supplier with the fastest time to market, even where there is
grave risk to privacy and national security. Cellular data traffic has been
increasing at an estimated compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 45%
since 2016, meaning that data traffic doubles every 1.87 years.3 This
estimated growth rate is exhausting existing wireless capacity and

* J.D. Candidate Class of 2021 at the University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. The author would like to thank Professor Chimène Keitner for supervising the drafting
of this paper, and for her ongoing encouragement and patience. The author would also like
to thank John Dermody for early-stage brainstorming discussions, the HICLR team for their
careful editing of this article, and my family for their unfailing support, especially through
law school and the pandemic.
1. Chris C. Demchak & Yuval Shavitt, China’s Maxim – Leave No Access Point
Unexploited: The Hidden Story of China Telecom’s BGP Hijacking, 3 M.C.A. (2018),
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol3/iss1/7.
2. Id.
3. Thomas L. Jarvis & J.C. Masullo, 5G Wireless Communications, in THE INTERNET
OF THINGS: LEGAL ISSUES, POLICY, AND PRACTICAL STRATEGIES 100 (Cynthia H. Cwik,
Christopher Suarez & Lucy L. Thomson eds., 2019).
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necessitating higher capacity data services.4 Compared to 4G LTE, fully
implemented 5G is expected to enable system capacity by1,000 times; ten
times the spectral efficiency and energy efficiency; twenty-five times the
average cell throughput; ten times longer battery life of devices; five times
reduced latency; and ubiquitous machine-to-machine (M2M), human-tomachine, and human-to-human communications.5
As of May 2020, Huawei, a Chinese Information and Communications
Technologies (ICT) company with extensive government subsidies, had
signed contracts for construction of 5G infrastructure in 30 countries,
including Iceland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.6 Due in part to pressure
from Washington, the United Kingdom has since announced that Huawei
components will not be used to build 5G infrastructure, and that Huawei
components currently in use will be removed by 2027.7 It is unclear what
will follow, though British Digital Secretary Oliver Dowden stated that the
ban could result in a cumulative cost of up to £2B and a two to three year
delay in 5G rollout.8
Considering the tension between market demand, national security, and
economic interests, governments are faced with the important questions of
who should be allowed to participate in the development and maintenance of
domestic telecommunications infrastructure, and how that critical
infrastructure can be protected from malicious actors. As national security,
economic, and technological priorities are increasingly intertwined, tensions
arise, and both domestic entities as well as international regulatory bodies
are forced to implement and restructure relevant policies and tactics.9 That
said, where new policies prohibit the purchase of goods from certain
vendors, it is essential that there is an equally impactful incentive for firms
to develop secure telecommunications technology either domestically or in
ally countries. Otherwise, the prohibitive policies risk impeding domestic
industrial and economic interests in the name of national security.
It’s important to acknowledge upfront the distinctly U.S. lens of this
paper, and to address a few preconceptions that flow from that perspective.
Broadly speaking, it is politically untenable in the U.S. for the government
4. Id.
5. Id. at 104.
6. John R. Hoehn and Kelley M. Slayer, National Security Implications of Fifth
Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies. CRS. (February 24, 2020), https://crsreports.
congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11251.
7. Huawei: China Attacks UK’s “Groundless” Ban of 5G Kit, BBC, (July 15, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53412678.
8. Id.
9. Commerce Seeks Comment on Telecom Supply Chain Review Process, O’Melveny,
(December 3, 2019), https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/alerts/clientalert-commerce-seeks-comment-on-telecom-suplly-chain-review-process/.
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to intervene in the market despite the fact that many such policies exist.
Regardless, we must reevaluate the hands-off policy approach. The global
economy is a different playing field when the number two player is not only
an aggressor but operates under a different value system as it pertains to
economic competition, democracy, privacy rights, and intellectual property
rights.
This paper provides (1) a technical walk-through, including definitions
of network components and a description of how cellular networks operate;
(2) an explanation of how networks are hijacked and the risks associated with
hijacking; (3) an overview of 5G technology and why we need it; (4) the
landscape of international and U.S. domestic telecommunications policy;
and (5) an evaluation of Access Reciprocity as a solution to national security
and economic vulnerabilities.
Access Reciprocity agreements, which could be adopted in parallel or
as an addendum to existing regional trade agreements (RTAs), would be
likely to offset the threat of government sponsored cyber-attacks. That said,
unless the U.S. and our allies put the same resources behind
telecommunication innovation that our adversaries have, this approach could
stunt the U.S.’s competitive edge in other sectors.
II. Cellular Network Components and How They Work
Effectively evaluating policy options for telecommunications security
requires a basic understanding of the technologies and actors involved in
contemporary networks. A high-level technological overview, at minimum,
is essential to determining the extent to which adversaries should be allowed
to interact with domestic networks.
Contemporary cellular networks have three main components: The
Radio Access Network (RAN) that communicates over the air, the Core
Network (CN) that connects the RAN network to control services and
external services, and the Users’ Equipment (UE), which includes mobile
phones.10 RANs have a base station that encodes and formats data and an
antenna that transmits data.11 The CN links that RAN to the cellular
operator’s internal control systems and to external systems like landline
telephones, Internet, SMS texting, and other cellular systems.12
In terms of actors, networks include remote individual users, ISPs, and
telecommunication service providers. The loci that connect ISPs based in

10.
11.
12.

Jarvis, supra, note 3 at 100.
Id.
Id.
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different geographies are called network access points (NAPs).13 The loci
that connect remote users to communications networks are called Points of
Presence (PoPs). 14 “[A] PoP is the point at which two or more different
networks or communication devices build a connection with each other. PoP
mainly refers to an access point, location, or facility that connects to and
helps other devices establish a connection with the Internet.”15 PoPs are
usually located in data centers and hold multiple servers, routers, and other
interface equipment.16
Hijacking the Internet requires the ability to manipulate aspects of
contractual and regulatory agreements that dictate who moves information
packets to whom across the Internet.17 The Internet is made up of tens of
thousands of Autonomous Systems (each one individually known as an AS),
which are independently managed networks connected through peer-to-pay
contractual agreements.18 Each AS independently controls access to and
from its internal network nodes.19 A user inside one AS can communicate
with a user in a different AS through the first user’s own AS gateway
servers.20 An illustrative example is a university network whose students
connect to other students by routers inside the university’s network and
connect to others outside the network by passing through the university’s
gateway servers.21
A small number of very large Autonomous Systems form the “tier 1”
or “backbone” of the global Internet.22 Those large ASs typically establish
reciprocal peering agreements to share massive volumes of traffic without
paying transit fees.23 All other ASs must pay or negotiate for packet
transfers.24 Telecommunications companies own and operate the major PoPs

13. Margaret Rouse, Network Access Point (NAP), TECHTARGET, (April 2005),
https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/network-access-point-NAP
14.Point of Presence (PoP), TECHOPEDIA, (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.techo
pedia.com/definition/1704/point-of-presence-pop.
15. Id.
16. Michael Isberto, What is a Point of Presence (PoP)?, COLOCATION AMERICA (Sept.
24, 2019), https://www.colocationamerica.com/blog/point-of-presence?amp.
17. Demchak, supra, at 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Hari Balkrishnan, Wide-Area Internet Routing, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2 (January 2009),
https://web.mit.edu/6.033/www/papers/InterdomainRouting.pdf.
24. Demchak, supra, at 2.
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that connect traffic across ASs.25 This means that telecoms control the major
nodes of global internet traffic flow.26
The movement of data traffic requires that both senders and recipients
have their own address. Each AS is assigned an Autonomous System
Number (ASN) to identify itself globally for the receipt of information
packets.27 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) designates
each AS a block of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.28 If the AS is also an
ISP, the AS further assigns some of its IP addresses to home users and other
IP addresses in blocks to business customers.29
Information is sent across intervening ASs as small data packets with
destination IP addresses attached.30 Each router in the transited network
looks at the destination IP address in the packet and forwards it to the next
and closest AS according to a forwarding table.31 There are two forms of
software protocols involved: Internet Protocol (IP) and Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP).32
The pathway for any data packet is based on multiple economic and
engineering factors but a key consideration is distance. Shorter distances are
uniformly preferred.33 As mentioned above, the forwarding tables provide
the next and closest AS router for a given packet to cross. The servers
hosting the BGP build the forwarding tables and share them across
contributing ASs.34 Within the BGP forwarding tables, ASs announce to
other ASs the IP address blocks that belong to them so that the AS can be
used as a destination or transit node.35
III. Threats to Internet Security
A. Internet Hijacking and How It Occurs
Given the complexity of configuring a BGP, errors occur.36 The
possibility of errors offers malicious actors the opportunity to hijack data

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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transfer routes without being detected.37 “If network AS1 mistakenly
announces through its BGP that it owns an IP block that is actually owned
by network AS2, traffic from a portion of the Internet destined for AS2 will
… be routed to – and through – AS1. If the erroneous announcement was
maliciously arranged, then a BGP hijack has occurred.”38
Most BGP hijacks are the work of government agencies or large
criminal organizations with access to, leverage over, or control of ISPs and
strategically placed PoPs. For example, in 2008, the tier 1 AS for Pakistan
accidentally hijacked all YouTube traffic for several hours in an attempt to
censor a non-Islamic clip within its borders.39 Another example is the
intentional hijack that occurred on April 8, 2010, when China Telecom
hijacked 15% of Internet traffic for eighteen minutes in what is believed to
be both a large-scale test and a demonstration of China’s ability to control
the flow of information over the Internet.40
Orchestrating a BGP hijack is complex but becomes easier when a
complicit, largescale ISP is likely to be a central point of transit.41
Researchers at BGProtect, an organization associated with the DIMES
project at Tel Aviv University, built a route tracing system that monitors
BGP announcements and distinguishes patterns that suggest accidental or
deliberate hijacking.42 Using this approach, Tel Aviv University professor
Yuval Shavitt and Director of the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies at the
U.S. Naval War College, Dr. Chris C. Demchak, observed systematic
hijacking patterns associated with China Telecom.
Hijacking attacks are particularly dangerous because they target critical
exchanges of information.43 In a hijack, sensitive data flows across
adversary networks with little detection by the victim network’s
administrators. The hijacks give the attacker access to the victim
organization’s network and provide an opportunity to steal data, add
malicious implants to seemingly normal traffic, or modify or corrupt data.44
In order to have global reach, attackers need to use a network that has a
global presence so that the network they’re using is not too far from any
potential victim network. “The closer a network is to the attacker or
complicit ISP, the more likely an attack will succeed because defending
administrators are less likely to have enough time to detect, analyze, and
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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mitigate the attack.” 45
A government that seeks to hijack the
telecommunications networks of an adversary will need to own or control
networks with a broad geographical spread.46
1. Examples of Internet Hijacking: China Telecom in North America
Since entering North American networks in the early 2000’s, China
Telecom has grown to control ten PoPs in the United States and Canada
(eight in the U.S. and two in Canada).47 The China Telecom PoPs span both
coasts and all major exchange points in the U.S. Few other foreign ISPs have
such a presence on U.S. soil.48
The researchers at BGProtect observed how China Telecom leveraged
their numerous PoPs to accomplish major sensitive data reroutes in 2016 and
2017.49 In February 2016, China Telecom hijacked routes from Canada to
Korean government sites so that the sensitive data flowed through China.
The normal transit route was Toronto-Maryland-Korea. After the hijack, the
information flowed from a China Telecom POP in Toronto, to another China
Telecom PoP on the West Coast of the U.S., to China, and then finally to its
destination in Korea. This particular hijack lasted for six months and was
repeated afterward for shorter durations.50
In October 2016, China Telecom attempted a similar hijack, this time
with a large Anglo-American bank headquartered in Italy.51 The attack
started at a ChinaNet (a wholly owned subsidiary of China Telecom) PoP
near Los Angeles.52 The traffic was rerouted to China but was unsuccessful
as, after nine hours, the traffic never made it to its ultimate destination in
Milan.53
Several other hijacks were recorded in 2017, including that of a large
American news organization whose traffic was hijacked in Scandinavia and
redirected through China on its way to Japan.54 Another involved a mail
server of a large financial company in Thailand whose traffic was hijacked
at a ChinaNet PoP in California.55 The ISP attack affected at least two large
45. Id. at 5.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id.; see also ChinaNet Access, China Telecom Americas, (May 22, 2020),
https://www.ctamericas.com/products-services/internet/chinanet-access/.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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U.S. mail server providers and occurred in parallel to an attack on several
major providers in South Korea.56 These attacks spanned hours to weeks and
were repeated multiple times throughout 2017.57
B. Other Security Vulnerabilities
As described above, cellular networks have two primary elements
(excluding individual user equipment): the core network that provides the
gateway to the Internet, and the RAN, which is composed of cell towers that
broadcast and receive radio signals. This is important because some analysts
believe that while the risk posed by Chinese access to core networks is
significant, as illustrated by the research of BGProtect, the risk posed by
access to the RAN is manageable. 58 Others argue that any Chinese
equipment in the network poses meaningful security risks.59 Some analysts
even go as far as to suggest that the U.S. should limit intelligence sharing
with any country operating Chinese-supplied 5G equipment.60
Since the FCC authorized China Telecom to operate
telecommunications services from within the U.S. in 2007, various agencies
concerned with national and trade security have become aware of China’s
role in malicious cyber activity against the United States.61 The Department
of Justice’s National Security Division, Foreign Investment Review Section,
identified the following compliance issues through its mitigation monitoring
program: Inaccurate statements by China Telecom to U.S. government
authorities about where the company stores U.S. records, raising questions
about who has access to those records; inaccurate public statements by China
Telecom regarding its cybersecurity practices, raising questions about China
Telecom’s compliance with cybersecurity and privacy laws and the nature
of China Telecom’s U.S. operations, which provide opportunities for
Chinese state-actors to commit economic espionage, and disruption and
rerouting of U.S. communications, as described above.62 This is all part of a

56. Id. at 7.
57. Id.
58. Hoehn, supra note 6.Technologies. CRS (Feb. 24, 2020), https://crsreports.
congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11251.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Press release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Branch Agencies Recommend the FCC
Revoke and Terminate China Telecom’s Authorizations to Provide International
Telecommunications Services in the United States (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/executive-branch-agencies-recommend-fcc-revoke-and-terminate-chinatelecom-s-authorizations.
62. Id.
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broader concern that China Telecom is vulnerable to exploitation, influence,
and control by the Chinese government.63
When considering whether permitting any Chinese telecommunications
technologies to exist in one’s own nation is safe, it’s worth taking a look at
China’s domestic policies concerning intelligence gathering. In 2017, ten
years after China Telecom was permitted to establish a presence in the U.S.,
China enacted a National Intelligence Law.64 The law states that “any
organization and citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide
assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy
of any national intelligence work that they are aware of.”65 Many analysts
interpret the law as requiring telecommunications companies to cooperate
with the Chinese government’s intelligence gathering efforts by installing
backdoors or handing private data over to the government.66
IV. Fifth Generation (5G) Wireless Communication Technologies
As telecommunications technology increases in sophistication and
capability, it is imperative that nations deploy 5G in a globally competitive
timeframe in order to support the innovation enabled by this infrastructure
while also preserving national security, intellectual property, and privacy.
With that in mind, it is helpful to understand what 5G is and why it so
important.
By way of background, early wireless mobile communications were
enabled by propriety radio interfaces that did not support roaming to nonproprietary networks.67 Mobility was limited to the geographic area of the
subscriber’s carrier and roaming to other networks using the same or other
technologies was not generally available.68 Voluntary governmental
Standards Setting Organizations (SSOs) established radio interface
technologies that facilitated roaming, enabling multiple infrastructure and
mobile phone providers to ensure compatibility of their products.69 Among
multiple competing SSOs are the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).70
The ITU is part of the UN and sets high level technology goals.71 The ETSI’s
63. Id.
64. Hoehn, supra note 6.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 97.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 98.
70. Id.
71. About International Telecommunication Union (ITU), ITU (May 22, 2020) https://
www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx.

3 - Wightman HICLR 44-1 (Do Not Delete)

74

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

11/25/2020 12:45 PM

[Vol. 44:1

3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) develops specifications for the
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), and the follow-on
specifications for LTE and 5G.72
The first 4G network was deployed in 2010.73 Technical specifications
for 4G networks require high data transmission speeds, high aggregate data
capacity for all users within a cell, and low latency.74 These capabilities
made possible the first practical large-scale Internet of Things (IoT) systems.
Beyond IoT, the performance expectation was that 4G would support mobile
Internet Protocol telephony (IP telephony), gaming services, high-definition
mobile TV, video conferencing, and 3D television.75 It’s worth mentioning
that Long-Term Evolution (LTE) is the predominate 4G wireless
technology.76
As stated earlier, cellular data traffic has been increasing at an estimated
CAGR of 45% since 2016, meaning that data traffic doubles every 1.87
years.77 This estimated growth rate is exhausting existing wireless capacity,
thereby necessitating higher capacity data services. Rather than completely
replacing existing systems, 5G will add an additional layer of connectivity
for high-demand applications.78
The ITU began planning for 5G in 2012 with complete network
specifications targeted for 2020, the specification became known as
International Mobile Telecommunications 2020 (IMT 2020).79 On June 4,
2018, 3GPP released specifications for 5G NR for mobile users and 5G Core
Network (5GC).80

72. Jarvis, 5G Wireless Communications, supra, at 98.
73. Id.
74. Id. See, ITU-R Report M.2134, Requirements Related to Technical Performance for
IMT-Advanced Radio Interface(s) (2008), https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-r/opb/rep/R-REPM.2134-2008-PDF-E.pdf; Grace Petrin, Radiocommunication Sector ITU-R FAQ on
International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) (May 9, 2018), available at http://www
.itu.int/en/ITU-R/Documents/ITU-R-FAQ-IMT.pdf.
75. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 98; see also Petra, supra note 74.
76. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 99.
77. Id. at 99-100; Paul Schmitt & Elizabeth Belding, Low on Air: Inherent Wireless
Channel Capacity Limitations, LIMITS (June 22-24, 2017), available at https://www.
cs.princeton.edu/~pschmitt/docs/limits02-schmittA.pdf.
78. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 100; Fredric Kronestedt et al., The Advantages of Combining
5G NR with LTE, 9 ERICSSON TECH. REV. (Oct. 30, 2018), available at https://www.
ericsson.com/assets/local/publications/ericsson-technology-review/docs/2018/etr-2018-095g-radiodeployment.pdf.
79. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 101; see also, e.g., ITU towards “IMT for 2020 and Beyond”,
ITU, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/study-groups/rsg5/rwp5d/imt-2020/Pages/default.aspx (last
accessed Dec. 14, 2018).
80. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 101.
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The ITU’s IMT 2020 specification classified 5G mobile network
services into three groups targeted at different use cases: eMBB, URLLC,
and mMTC. 81 eMBB (Enhanced Mobile Broadband) is a “bigger pipe” that
provides high data/bandwidth throughput.82 eMBB supports services like
high-definition videos, virtual reality, and augmented reality.83 URLLC
(Ultra-Reliable and Low-Latency Communications) facilitates “higher
pressure” data flows for near instantaneous (<1 ms) reactions, enabling
latency-sensitive services.84 Supported use cases for URLLC include remote
surgery, assisted and automated driving, and manufacturing robotics.85
mMTC (Massive Machine-Type Communications) enables high-density
pipeline communications (<1M/km2 connections).86 This service is
appropriate for smart cities, smart agriculture, and other use cases involving
tens of thousands of connected devices.87
Compared to 4G LTE, fully implemented 5G should deliver the
following benefits: 1,000 times the system capacity; 10 times the spectral
efficiency and energy efficiency; 25 times the average cell throughput; 10
times longer battery life; 5 times reduced latency; and ubiquitous (M2M),
human-to-machine, and human-to-human communications.88
According to some sources, there is still a long way to go in developing
a global, commercially available 5G network. The term “5G” is used broadly
in the U.S. and has the marketing function of referring to faster, highercapacity service.89 This has led to many carriers branding incremental
changes to existing infrastructure as such. 90 In spite of marketing efforts,
full implementation of 5G will take five years or more.91

81. Id. at 102; Heejung Yu, et al., What Is 5G? Emerging 5G Mobile Services and
Network Requirements, 9 SUSTAINABILITY 1848 (Oct. 15, 2017), available at
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/9/10/1848/pdf.
82. Id. at 103.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 103-4; Rony K. Saha & Chaodit Aswakul, Fundamentals of 5G Mobile
Network: Architecture, Requirement, Densification, Cooperation, and Resource Management
(July 2016), Sec 2.2, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305536508_FUNDAMENT
ALS_OF_5G_MOBILE_NETWORK_Architecture_Requirement_Densification_Cooperati
on_and_Resource_Management.
89. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 101.
90. Id. at 102; Ferry Grijpink et al., The Road to 5G: The Inevitable Growth of
Infrastructure Cost, MCKINSEY (Feb. 2018), htps://www.mckinsey.com/industries/
telecommunications/our-insights/the-road-to-5g-the-inevitable-growth-of-infrastucture-cost.
91. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 102.
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There are a number of firms making incredible strides in producing 5G
infrastructure. Among the most powerful are Huawei, Nokia, and Ericsson.92
Huawei is the largest supplier of communications technology in the world.93
To date, Huawei has signed contracts for construction of 5G infrastructure
in 30 countries, including Iceland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.94 The
United States banned the use of Huawei hardware in government projects
because of the company’s suspected involvement in Chinese cyberattack and
intelligence-gathering operations.95 In July 2020, the United Kingdom, amid
a rhetorical firestorm, also implemented a Huawei ban, citing national
security interests that China claims are unfounded.96 Reports find that
Huawei has benefitted from as much as $75B in state support.97
Nokia is a Finnish multinational telecommunication, information
technology, and consumer electronics firm. Several of the company’s recent
acquisitions have brought Nokia to a position of leadership in 5G
networking.98 In 2018, Nokia contracted with T-Mobile to provide the
mobile carrier with 5G network infrastructure in a deal worth $3.5B, which
at the time was the largest 5G deal in the world.99 In addition to its contract
with
T-Mobile, Nokia
has
over
20
agreements with
other
telecommunications providers world-wide, including AT&T, Vodafone, and
Optus.100 As of 2018, Nokia had engaged in approximately 100 individual
trials of 5G technology, including operational efficiency tests in South Korea
and the launch of a 5G-based home internet service in Australia.101
Ericsson is similarly aggressive in the 5G space. The Swedish
telecommunications giant is developing a proprietary 5G technology
called Ericsson Spectrum Sharing, which “relies on algorithms to efficiently
allocate spectrum bandwidth across 4G and 5G networks in line with
92. The Race for 5G: How 20 Corporations Are Building the Future of Connectivity,
CBInsights, (April 23, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/corporations-5g-futureconnectivity/.
93. Id.
94. Hoehn, supra note 6.
95. The Race for 5G: How 20 Corporations Are Building the Future of Connectivity,
supra note 92.
96. Huawei: China Attacks UK’s “Groundless” Ban of 5G Kit, supra note 7.
97. Chuin-Wei Yap, State Support Helped Fuel Huawei’s Global Rise, The Wall Street
Journal (Dec. 25, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweisglobal-rise-11577280736.
98. Our History, Nokia, (May 5, 2020), https://www.nokia.com/about-us/what-wedo/our-history/.
99. The Race for 5G: How 20 Corporations Are Building the Future of Connectivity,
CBInsights, (April 23, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/corporations-5g-futureconnectivity/.
100. Id.
101. Id.

3 - Wightman HICLR 44-1 (Do Not Delete)

2021]

11/25/2020 12:45 PM

Global Shift to 5G

77

network traffic.”102 As of spring 2019, Ericsson entered into at least ten
formal 5G contracts with various service providers around the world.103
Ericsson advertises 5G development projects with AT&T, China Mobil,
Deutche Telecom, Korea Telecom, Turkcell, TeliaSonera, Verizon, and
Vodafone.104
V. Telecommunications Network Security Policy
A. Traditional Policy Approaches
There are a variety of different approaches governments can take to
protect various aspects of their telecommunications networks. Among the
most common are tariffs, localization requirements, IP related measures,
national standards-and-conformity assessments, and ICT supply chain
restrictions.105
Historically, policymakers focused on tariffs as the method by which
governments could attempt to protect domestic economic interests or
influence the policies of would-be trade partners. At present, most nations
do not levy tariffs on Information and Communications Technologies (ICT)
products because of existing Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) or the
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Information Technology Agreement
(ITA).106
Some governments institute localization requirements that in some
instances bolster cybersecurity but are often designed to favor domestic
service providers.107 Localization requirements are defined as “measures
that compel companies to conduct certain digital-trade-related activities
within a country’s borders.”108 Some governments bar data transfer
altogether while others require that a copy of the data is stored within its
territory.109 While the justifications for localization policies include
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Shaping History, Ericsson, (May 5, 2020), https://www.ericsson.com/en/aboutus/history/shaping-history.
105. Rachel F. Fefer et al., Digital Trade and U.S. Trade Policy, CRS, 12 (May 21, 2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44565.pdfhttps://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44565.pdf.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 14.
108. Id. at 13; U.S. International Trade Commission, Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global
Economies, Part 1, Publication No: 4415, Investigation No: 332-531, 16 (July 2013),
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4415.pdf.
109. Mark Wu, Digital Trade-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Existing
Models and Lessons for the Multilateral Trade System, RTA Exchange, 23 (November 2017),
http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/RTA-Exchange-Digital-Trade-MarkWu-Final.pdf.
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protecting citizens’ data and ensuring law enforcement’s access to
information, many nations worry that the policies are protectionist,
especially as data become increasingly valuable.110 For that reason, several
nations use Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) to ban localization
requirements.111 That said, even where localization policies are not strictly
protectionist, the requirements only address some of the potential threats to
secure telecommunications, national security, and economic interests.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and IPR related measures can protect
domestic economic interests as well as promote innovation, but they can also
function similarly to localization requirements when used to disadvantage
foreign companies.112 That said, the U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC) exercises the authority of the legislative and executive branches to bar
importation of technology that infringes on a U.S. patent under 19 U.S.C.
§337.113 Of all section 337 complaints that are filed, about one in three is
filed by a non-U.S.-based company.114 The ITC has in rem jurisdiction over
all products imported into the U.S., and with the relocation of semiconductor
and electronics manufacturing to Asia, most telecommunications products
fall within the ITS’s jurisdiction.115 Unfortunately, IPR related measures do
little to protect a nations interest when violations go undetected or when
agreements are circumvented by adversaries, such as in the case of the XiObama antitheft agreement of 2015.116
Another approach is the implementation of local or national technology
standards and testing requirements that differ significantly from international
standards.117 While these requirements can improve cybersecurity, they can
also make it difficult for technology firms to enter particular markets where
products cannot connect, and can burden companies by delaying time to
market and forcing additional expenses.118
Finally, governments can significantly restrict or flat out prohibit the
purchase of ICT goods from particular companies or countries. This is the

110. Id.
111. Id. at 24.
112. Fefer, supra note 105, at 17.
113. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 119.
114. Id. at 120; KEITH E. MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE
GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(2012).
115. Id.
116. Demchak, supra note 1, at 1.
117. Fefer, supra note 105, at 17.
118. Id.; USTR, 2019 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 242
(March 2019).
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most extreme measure as it can amount to a total barrier to trade. An
example of such a policy can be found below in Executive Order 13873.119
B. Current U.S. Domestic Policy
It is suspected that China has been pursuing cyber-capabilities directed
at U.S. national security interests for decades.120 In recent years, the U.S.
has had to work quickly to manage the threat to our national security,
economic, and technological interests posed by China’s ability to steal
information from the United States. Of primary importance to the security
of U.S. and U.S. allies’ telecommunications systems are the 2015 Xi-Obama
agreement, Trump’s Executive Order on Securing the Information and
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (which
encompasses the 5G FAST Plan), and the revocation of China Telecom
permissions that occurred in April 2020.
1. 2015 Xi-Obama Agreement
During President Xi Jingping’s visit to Washington in September 2015,
the United States and China agreed “that neither country’s government will
conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property,
including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the
intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial
sectors.”121 From the perspective of some, the so called 2015 Xi-Obama
antitheft agreement forced the Chinese government to find new ways of
getting information from foreign nations, and many in the U.S. and other
nations viewed Chinese firms such as Huawei and ZTE with suspicion.122
Data suggests China was able to leverage seemingly innocuous service
providers to bypass the 2015 agreement without notice and gain access to
information.123
Furthermore, while the Xi-Obama agreement prohibited direct attacks
on computer networks, it did nothing to prevent the hijacking of Internet
infrastructure. As previously discussed, China Telecom has ten PoPs across
the internet backbone of North America. “Vast rewards can be reaped from
119. Exec. Order No. 13873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 15, 2019).
120. John W. Rollins, U.S.-China Cyber Agreement, Fed’n of Am. Scientists (Oct. 16,
2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10376.pdf.
121. Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States, The White House
President Barack Obama (Sept. 25, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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the hijacking, diverting, and then copying of information-rich traffic going
into or crossing the United States and Canada – often unnoticed and then
delivered with only small delays.”124
After the signing of Xi-Obama agreement, China transitioned from a
strategy of military-initiated cybertheft to cybertheft committed by
commercial service providers (highlighting the different economic and
political ideologies between China and the U.S. mentioned in the
introduction of this paper). This strategic shift necessitates a response from
the U.S. in the form of policy changes. These changes have been slow
coming as it has taken several years to detect and respond to BGP Hijacks
and other related threats.
2. Executive Order (E.O.) 13873 On Securing the ICT and ICT
….Services Supply Chain
On May 15, 2019, President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order
on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services
Supply Chain.125 The order prohibits transactions involving information and
communications technologies or services “designed, developed,
manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to
the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary,” where those transactions pose an
undue or unacceptable risk to critical infrastructure in the United States,
United States National Security, or the United States Economy.126
3. March 2020 National Strategy to Secure 5G
The spring of 2020 brought an onslaught of government statements and
publicized strategies concerning the secure development of 5G infrastructure
in the United States. Among the first was the White House’s “National
Strategy to Secure 5G of the United States of America” (the Strategy). The
Strategy provides a general description of the risks discussed earlier in this
paper, and outlines four “lines of effort” that dictate how the government is
moving forward in this space.

124.
125.
126.

Id.
Trump supra note at 119.
Id.
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a. Line of Effort #1: Facilitating Domestic 5G Rollout and the 5G
FAST Plan
The first Line of Effort that the administration discusses is the
facilitation of a “private sector-led rollout of 5G, primarily coordinated by
the National Economic Council.”127 The Strategy goes on to describe the
FCC’s Facilitate America’s Superiority in 5G Technology plan, also known
as the 5G FAST Plan, which was issued September 28, 2018.128 This plan
consists of three major goals: license more 5G-specific spectrum for
commercial use, update infrastructure policies, and “modernize” existing
regulations to promote deployment of 5G.129
Since the FAST Plan was set in motion in 2018, the FCC released
spectrum licenses as follows: in January 2019, the FCC closed the auction of
28GHz spectrum licenses;130 in June 2019, the FCC closed the auction of
24GHz;131 and on March 12, 2020, the FCC concluded the largest spectrum
auction in U.S. history, making available 3,400 megahertz of millimeterwave spectrum in the Upper 37 GHz, 39 GHz, and 47 GHz bands across 99%
of available licenses.132 It’s worth mentioning that all the spectrum licenses
that have been released for use in commercial 5G networks to date are above
6GHz, which are the bands that provide impressive capacity and enable
massive channel sizes capable of delivering multi-gigabit connectivity.133
Auctions of mid-band 5G spectrum originally scheduled for the end of June
of this year (2020) have been postponed until the end of July 2020 in light
of the economic downturn caused by the novel coronavirus.134 Those
auctions are underway as of the writing of this paper.135
127. Donald J. Trump, National Strategy to Secure 5G of the United States of America,
The White House (Mar. 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/
National-Strategy-5G-Final.pdf.
128. The FCC’s 5G FAST Plan, fcc.gov, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC354326A1.pdf.
129. Trump, supra note 127, at 2.
130. Auction 101: Spectrum Frontiers – 28 GHz, fcc.gov, (May 5, 2020), https://www.
fcc.gov/auction/101.
131. Auction 102 Closing Public Notice, Federal Communications Commission (May 28,
2019), https://www.fcc.gov/document/auction-102-closing-public-notice.
132. Katie Gorscak, FCC Concludes Largest Ever Spectrum Auction, Advancing
American Leadership in 5G, FC News from the Federal Communications Commission (Mar.
12, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-363000A1.pdf.
133. Jarvis, supra note 3 at 106.
134. Diana Goovaerts, FCC Delays 3.5 GHz Auction, Mobile World Live (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.mobileworldlive.com/featured-content/top-three/fcc-delays-3-5ghz-auction/.
135. Auction 105: 3.5 GHz, Federal Communications Commission Public Reporting
System, https://auctiondata.fcc.gov/public/projects/auction105 (July 23, 2020); see also Will
Wiquist, FCC Starts First 5G Mid-Band Spectrum Auction Today, FC News from the Federal
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As part of updating infrastructure policies to encourage private-sector
investment in 5G, the FCC has taken steps to speed up federal review of
small cells (as opposed to large cell towers) as well as state and local reviews
of small cells.136 This change distinguishes between large and small wireless
facilities. On the federal level, this means the following: small wireless
facilities deployed on non-Tribal lands are excluded from National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA) and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
review; the process for Tribal participation in Section 106 historic
preservation reviews for large wireless facilities where NHPA and NEPA
review is required will be clarified; the requirement that applicants file
Environmental Assessments solely due to the location of a proposed facility
in a floodplain no longer applies if certain conditions are met; and there are
now firm timeframes for the Commission to act on Environmental
Assessments.137
The “modernization of outdated regulation” involves four key orders:
Restoring Internet Freedom; Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment
by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, which covers Intellectual
Property (IP) issues as well as equipment regulation updates; Business Data
Services; and Protecting Against National Security Threats to the
Communications Supply Chain.138
The FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom Declaratory Ruling reverses
FCC utility-style regulations implemented in 2015, thought to impose
substantial costs on the Internet industry and hinder innovation, and
reinstates the Title I classification of broadband Internet access under the
Communications Act.139 Meanwhile, the associated Report and Order
requires ISPs to disclose information about any blocking, throttling, paid
prioritization, or affiliated prioritization to consumers, entrepreneurs, and the
FCC.140 The Report and Order also eliminates the Internet Conduct
Standard, finding that transparency, market forces, and antitrust and
consumer protection laws pave a more efficient and affordable path to
innovation. 141

Communications Commission (July 23, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC365702A1.pdf.
136. The FCC’s 5G FAST Plan, supra note 126.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. FCC Releases Restoring Internet Freedom Order, Federal Communications
Commission (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-restoring-internetfreedom-order.
140. Id. at 130.
141. Id. at 143.
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b. Line of Effort #2: Assessing Risk and Identifying Security Principles
The Strategy’s Line of Effort #2 describes on a high level the U.S.
government’s plans to coordinate interagency and private sector
collaboration to determine, develop, and implement core security principles
to United States 5G infrastructure.142 The Strategy also refers to “The Prague
Proposals”, which are an unsigned but generally agreed upon list of
guidelines for 5G development that resulted from the Prague 5G Security
Conference in May 2019.143 The Prague Proposals consist of four categories
of recommendations, each of which emphasizes the importance of
technology, policy, and security collaboration in an economically and
technologically viable 5G market.144
c. Line of Effort #3: Addressing 5G Infrastructure Risks to Security
Line of Effort #3 describes the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain
Security Act of 2018 (the Act) as well as E.O. 13873 on “Securing the
Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain”
which was discussed earlier in this paper.145 The Act established the Federal
Acquisition Security Council, whose role is to develop supply chain risk
management standards, guidelines, and practices for executive agencies.
The Act also provides a structure for preventing the use and procurement of
potentially dangerous sources or covered articles in executive agency
information systems.146 As discussed above, E.O. 13873 goes a step further
by prohibiting transactions involving information and communications
technologies or services “designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by
persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign
adversary.”147

142. Trump, supra note 127, at 3.
143. Id.; see also H.R. Res. 575, 116th Cong. (2019) (Expressing the sense of the House
of Representatives that all stakeholders in the deployment of 5G communications
infrastructure should carefully consider adherence to the recommendations of “The Prague
Proposals”).
144. H.R. Res. 575, 116th Cong. (2019), supra note 143.
145. Trump, supra note 127, at 4.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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d. Line of Effort #4: Global Development and Deployment of 5G
Infrastructure
The Strategy’s final Line of Effort highlights the necessity of
international cooperation in the implementation of telecommunications
security measures. The Strategy promises that the U.S. will continue to
participate in the development of international 5G security principles,
similarly to its participation in the Prague 5G Security Conference, and that
the government will work with commercial, academic, and other
international partners to accomplish the implementation of these
standards.148
4. Revoking China Telecom Authorizations
On April 9, 2020, the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security,
Defense, State, Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative
unanimously recommended that the FCC revoke and terminate China
Telecom’s authorizations to provide telecommunications services to and
from the United States.149 In its recommendation, these agencies identified
“substantial and unacceptable national security and law enforcement risks
associated with China Telecom’s operations, which render the FCC
authorizations inconsistent with the public interest.”150
C. Existing International Agreements
Because no single telecommunications provider covers the entire globe,
telecommunication networks must connect across borders to transmit
information. This requires open channels of trade and uniform security
measures. The interconnectedness of the global telecommunications
network necessarily means that security vulnerabilities in one network can
result in security vulnerabilities for those whose information is originally
transmitted by, and perhaps to, a different network. While the World Trade
Organization (WTO) manages issues related to the trade in
telecommunications goods and services among participating nations,
cybersecurity standards tend to be more common in regional trade
148. Id.
149. Executive Branch Agencies Recommend the FCC Revoke and Terminate China
Telecom’s Authorizations to Provide International Telecommunications Services in the
United States, The United States Department of Justice (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/executive-branch-agencies-recommend-fcc-revoke-and-terminate-china-teleco
m-s-authorizations.
150. Id.
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agreements. The following sections describe how WTO agreements and
RTAs between particular nations deal with international telecommunications
trade differently.
1. WTO Provisions Relating to Digital Trade and Telecommunications
The WTO’s primary goal is to promote free trade by reducing barriers
to trade among participating nations.151 It accomplishes this goal through
agreements negotiated and signed by most of the world’s trading nations.
The WTO then enforces these agreements and when trade disputes arise, it
steps in to mediate or arbitrate. The WTO covers trade in goods, trade in
services, and intellectual property. Several agreements are of primary
relevance to this paper: the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), and the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).152
The GATS Annex on Telecommunications (the Annex) emphasizes the
importance of telecommunications infrastructure and promotes cooperation
amongst participating nations.153 The Annex requires WTO members to
allow service suppliers to use any protocol of choice in supplying
telecommunications services.154 The Annex categorizes services into four
different modes of supply, modes 3 and 4 are relevant here. Mode 3
commitments clarify whether a foreign service provider can establish a
commercial presence in the territory to deliver services, while mode 4
commitments clarify whether an individual from a foreign WTO member
country may be temporarily present in the territory to supply such a
service.155
Simultaneously, the ITA applies to trade in ICT products including
telecommunications equipment, and controls tariffs on IT products. The
TBT governs technical regulations and standards including standards
governing communication network interoperability and portability,
encryption and security, privacy regulations, and data storage.156
151. Rosamond Hutt, The World Trade Organization. Here’s What It Actually Does,
World Economic Forum (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/worldtrade-organization-wto-explained/.
152. Id.
153. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Telecommunications, Jan. 1,
1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
154. Mark Wu, Digital Trade-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Existing
Models and Lessons for the Multilateral Trade System, RTA Exchange (Nov. 2017),
http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/RTA-Exchange-Digital-Trade-Mark-W
u-Final.pdf.
155. Id. at 3.
156. Id. at 4.
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2. Telecommunications and Cybersecurity Provisions in RTAs
Beyond the agreements orchestrated by the WTO, many nations have
entered into regional trade agreements (RTAs). The WTO Agreements do
little in the way of influencing security-related regulatory measures, so RTAs
can serve as a means to set boundaries on what constitutes permissible
practice and to establish a set of common principles across a subset of WTO
members.157
Several RTAs contain provisions seeking to limit governments’ ability
to require firms to disclose source code as a condition to doing business in
one’s own territory.158 Some governments have enacted or are considering
such requirements, fearing that certain technologies may have embedded
backdoors that compromise privacy and national security.159 The reason to
limit such requirements is that they could facilitate IPR theft. That said, the
limitations do not apply to “software used for critical infrastructure.”160
While there may be a need to update the digital trade provisions of WTO
multilateral agreements, the issues are complex, and any changes are likely
years away.161 For that reason, RTAs are likely to remain the preferred
avenue through which digital trade rules, including those governing
telecommunications infrastructure security, evolve.162
VI. An Alternative Framework: Access Reciprocity
Many cybersecurity-related provisions in RTAs are aimed at facilitating
trade by limiting what a given party to the agreement can do to protect
industry, privacy, and security domestically. Meanwhile, much of the
United States’ domestic tactics work to limit our trade with hostile partners
and remove domestic governmental policies that slow implementation of
new technologies. None of these policies work cumulatively to facilitate
trade, spur production, and affirmatively protect telecommunications
network security. To this end, Demchak and Shavitt suggest a policy of
“Access Reciprocity” to curb BGP hijacks. While their recommendation
focuses specifically on BGP Hijacks and reciprocity in the number of PoPs
permitted between two given nations, they suggest that the policy could be
applied more broadly.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id.
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China has ten PoPs in North America. Meanwhile, U.S. companies
have zero PoPs in China.163 While some U.S. telecoms such as AT&T
advertise presence in China, it seems that presence is only by way of
collaboration with local players.164 There are no PoPs owned and operated
by AT&T or any other U.S. telecom in China.165 This imbalance of access
allows China to engage in malicious behavior without risk of retaliation.166
The observed hijacked routes described earlier come from, or are traveling
to, allied states.167 Because of the routing table bias for shortest routes, that
traffic is directed toward Chinese controlled PoPs in the U.S.168 If China
Telecom had fewer PoPs, hijacks would be more difficult to achieve because
they would be more visible to victim network administrators.169 Shavitt and
Demchak go as far as to suggest that China Telecom should not extend
beyond Hong Kong unless other telecoms were allowed to have PoPs in
China.170
The proposed policy of Access Reciprocity would incorporate a variety
of metrics to determine the fair number of PoPs a telecom would be allowed
to control on the soil of a foreign nation. One important metric would be the
hosting country’s population size.171 For example, if China Telecom is
permitted eight PoPs in the U.S., American companies should be permitted
three times that number of PoPs on Chinese soil sense the Chinese population
is three times that of the U.S. If the demand for reciprocal access is refused,
the appropriate defense would be to prevent any telecommunications traffic
associated with the United States from passing through a China Telecom
PoP.172 The policy is technically feasible because such routing rules could
be inserted in BGP’s routing tables and implemented as required.173
Demchak and Shavitt argue that a policy of Access Reciprocity is
desirable because it embodies interstate fairness, enhances cybersecurity for
the U.S. and its allies, and is easy to implement technically through
alterations in existing routing tables.174 They further suggest that any single
nation could pursue this policy but that its efficacy in deterring malicious

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Demchak, supra note 1, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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behavior long term is contingent upon democratic civil societies across the
globe acting in agreement.175
Furthermore, an Access Reciprocity strategy as applied to PoPs could
become the norm across international IT domains. “Imagine,” Demchak and
Shavitt implore, “if reciprocal fairness included security and privacy scrutiny
of a Chinese manufacturer’s source code before its product or any updates
may be imported into the U.S. or its allies – as is now the law in China.”176
It’s interesting to consider an expanded version of Access Reciprocity,
and how that might fit into relationships created by existing RTAs. Central
to the question of how such a provision could be adopted is the question of
whether the policy would function to push companies from adversarial
nations out of the market completely, or whether the purpose would be to
bring them safely into the flow of commerce.
If the purpose is to push adversarial nations out, then amending existing
RTAs to include Access Reciprocity might work to bolster security, but it
would likely slow the adoption of new technologies like 5G. In this instance,
nations connected through RTAs would agree to prohibit involvement from
potentially hostile nations in telecommunications infrastructure unless the
allied nations could be equally involved in the adversary’s networks. The
assumption here is that the adversary nations would not permit such
involvement, and that the nations who agreed to the provision would not buy
from the firms based in adversary nations. If that assumption is correct, the
side effect would be slowing 5G deployment. That could then compromise
the competitive position of other sectors that rely on access to 5G to innovate.
Alternatively, the policy could work to bring adversary nations into a
trade relationship that does not compromise national security, IPR, or
privacy interests. In that situation, governments would benefit from more
open trade but only because of a willingness to be vulnerable to attack. The
idea is that if both are equally vulnerable, they will be less likely to attack
the other, knowing that a retaliation would be inevitable. This is very
different from the schema of an RTA, in which the parties agree upon a wide
variety of provisions to reduce barriers to trade. Furthermore, it relies on the
assumption that commercial telecommunications providers would be equally
motivated and able to participate in the other nation’s infrastructure. It seems
that if the sole purpose of installing PoPs in an adversary nation is to retaliate
in the event of a hijack or other attack, that would fall into the military realm
rather than the commercial realm.

175.
176.

Id.
Id.

3 - Wightman HICLR 44-1 (Do Not Delete)

2021]

11/25/2020 12:45 PM

Global Shift to 5G

89

VII. Conclusion: Enhance Investment and
Broaden Access Reciprocity
The market demand for commercially available 5G networks is forcing
the U.S. and other nations to restructure domestic policies and international
trade relationships. In order to facilitate competitive development of 5G
infrastructure while protecting privacy and national security interests, a
combination of policy changes must take place. Access Reciprocity is a
viable solution only where nations that adopt such policies also maintain
competitive levels of investment in the telecommunications sector.
On the domestic front, nations such as the U.S. that do not typically
invest directly in commercial research and development efforts might
consider taking a more aggressive approach to promoting commercial
telecommunications infrastructure. While governmental market interventions
such as subsidies are often considered untenable in the U.S., it would be
reasonable to do more than remove environmental protections checks on
small telecommunications companies. A more proactive approach is
particularly appropriate in light of the $75B investments made by China, an
adversary and our strongest competitor in the space.
On the international front, allied nations could leverage Access
Reciprocity policies to offset cybersecurity threats caused by adversary
nations’ access to telecommunications infrastructure. This would preserve
valuable trade relationships while reducing the risk to privacy and national
security.
Such policies could be incorporated into existing trade
relationships by way of amending RTAs or creating new parallel agreements.
That said, this strategy would only be successful when combined with an
increase in technological investment. The reason for that is if adversary
nations do not permit our participation in their infrastructure, or if we lack
the technical capabilities to participate, the policy would create a limitation
on trade that could stunt progress and hinder competition in sectors that
depend on 5G.
As a follow up to this paper, it would be interesting to consider the ways
in which China supports firms like Huawei, and whether the U.S. or its allies
might be prepared to take similar action with domestic firms.
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